cosign verify-blob --help
Verify a signature on the supplied blob input using the specified key reference.
You may specify either a key, a certificate or a kms reference to verify against.
	If you use a key or a certificate, you must specify the path to them on disk.

The signature may be specified as a path to a file or a base64 encoded string.
The blob may be specified as a path to a file or - for stdin.

Usage:
cosign verify-blob [flags]

Examples:
 cosign verify-blob (--key <key path>|<key url>|<kms uri>)|(--certificate <cert>) --signature <sig> <blob>

  # Verify a simple blob and message
  cosign verify-blob --key cosign.pub (--signature <sig path>|<sig url> msg)

  # Verify a signature with certificate and CA certificate chain
  cosign verify-blob --certificate cert.pem --certificate-chain certchain.pem --signature $sig <blob>

  # Verify a signature with CA roots and optional intermediate certificates
  cosign verify-blob --certificate cert.pem --ca-roots caroots.pem [--ca-intermediates caintermediates.pem] --signature $sig <blob>

  # Verify a signature from an environment variable
  cosign verify-blob --key cosign.pub --signature $sig msg

  # verify a signature with public key provided by URL
  cosign verify-blob --key https://host.for/<FILE> --signature $sig msg

  # verify a signature with signature and key provided by URL
  cosign verify-blob --key https://host.for/<FILE> --signature https://example.com/<SIG>

  # Verify a signature against Azure Key Vault
  cosign verify-blob --key azurekms://[VAULT_NAME][VAULT_URI]/[KEY] --signature $sig <blob>

  # Verify a signature against AWS KMS
  cosign verify-blob --key awskms://[ENDPOINT]/[ID/ALIAS/ARN] --signature $sig <blob>

  # Verify a signature against Google Cloud KMS
  cosign verify-blob --key gcpkms://projects/[PROJECT ID]/locations/[LOCATION]/keyRings/[KEYRING]/cryptoKeys/[KEY] --signature $sig <blob>

  # Verify a signature against Hashicorp Vault
  cosign verify-blob --key hashivault://[KEY] --signature $sig <blob>

  # Verify a signature against GitLab with project name
  cosign verify-blob --key gitlab://[OWNER]/[PROJECT_NAME]  --signature $sig <blob>

  # Verify a signature against GitLab with project id
  cosign verify-blob --key gitlab://[PROJECT_ID]  --signature $sig <blob>

  # Verify a signature against a certificate
  cosign verify-blob --certificate <cert> --signature $sig <blob>


Flags:
    --bundle='':
	path to bundle FILE

    --ca-intermediates='':
	path to a file of intermediate CA certificates in PEM format which will be needed when building the
	certificate chains for the signing certificate. The flag is optional and must be used together with
	--ca-roots, conflicts with --certificate-chain.

    --ca-roots='':
	path to a bundle file of CA certificates in PEM format which will be needed when building the certificate
	chains for the signing certificate. Conflicts with --certificate-chain.

    --certificate='':
	path to the public certificate. The certificate will be verified against the Fulcio roots if the
	--certificate-chain option is not passed.

    --certificate-chain='':
	path to a list of CA certificates in PEM format which will be needed when building the certificate chain for
	the signing certificate. Must start with the parent intermediate CA certificate of the signing certificate and
	end with the root certificate. Conflicts with --ca-roots and --ca-intermediates.

    --certificate-github-workflow-name='':
	contains the workflow claim from the GitHub OIDC Identity token that contains the name of the executed
	workflow.

    --certificate-github-workflow-ref='':
	contains the ref claim from the GitHub OIDC Identity token that contains the git ref that the workflow run was
	based upon.

    --certificate-github-workflow-repository='':
	contains the repository claim from the GitHub OIDC Identity token that contains the repository that the
	workflow run was based upon

    --certificate-github-workflow-sha='':
	contains the sha claim from the GitHub OIDC Identity token that contains the commit SHA that the workflow run
	was based upon.

    --certificate-github-workflow-trigger='':
	contains the event_name claim from the GitHub OIDC Identity token that contains the name of the event that
	triggered the workflow run

    --certificate-identity='':
	The identity expected in a valid Fulcio certificate. Valid values include email address, DNS names, IP
	addresses, and URIs. Either --certificate-identity or --certificate-identity-regexp must be set for keyless
	flows.

    --certificate-identity-regexp='':
	A regular expression alternative to --certificate-identity. Accepts the Go regular expression syntax described
	at https://golang.org/s/re2syntax. Either --certificate-identity or --certificate-identity-regexp must be set
	for keyless flows.

    --certificate-oidc-issuer='':
	The OIDC issuer expected in a valid Fulcio certificate, e.g. https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com or
	https://oauth2.sigstore.dev/auth. Either --certificate-oidc-issuer or --certificate-oidc-issuer-regexp must be
	set for keyless flows.

    --certificate-oidc-issuer-regexp='':
	A regular expression alternative to --certificate-oidc-issuer. Accepts the Go regular expression syntax
	described at https://golang.org/s/re2syntax. Either --certificate-oidc-issuer or
	--certificate-oidc-issuer-regexp must be set for keyless flows.

    --experimental-oci11=false:
	set to true to enable experimental OCI 1.1 behaviour (unrelated to bundle format)

    -h, --help=false:
	help for verify-blob

    --insecure-ignore-sct=false:
	when set, verification will not check that a certificate contains an embedded SCT, a proof of inclusion in a
	certificate transparency log

    --insecure-ignore-tlog=false:
	ignore transparency log verification, to be used when an artifact signature has not been uploaded to the
	transparency log. Artifacts cannot be publicly verified when not included in a log

    --key='':
	path to the public key file, KMS URI or Kubernetes Secret

    --max-workers=10:
	the amount of maximum workers for parallel executions

    --new-bundle-format=true:
	expect the signature/attestation to be packaged in a Sigstore bundle

    --offline=false:
	only allow offline verification

    --private-infrastructure=false:
	skip transparency log verification when verifying artifacts in a privately deployed infrastructure

    --rekor-url='https://rekor.sigstore.dev':
	address of rekor STL server

    --rfc3161-timestamp='':
	path to RFC3161 timestamp FILE

    --sct='':
	path to a detached Signed Certificate Timestamp, formatted as a RFC6962 AddChainResponse struct. If a
	certificate contains an SCT, verification will check both the detached and embedded SCTs.

    --signature='':
	signature content or path or remote URL

    --signature-digest-algorithm='sha256':
	digest algorithm to use when processing a signature (sha224|sha256|sha384|sha512)

    --sk=false:
	whether to use a hardware security key

    --slot='':
	security key slot to use for generated key (default: signature)
	(authentication|signature|card-authentication|key-management)

    --timestamp-certificate-chain='':
	path to PEM-encoded certificate chain file for the RFC3161 timestamp authority. Must contain the root CA
	certificate. Optionally may contain intermediate CA certificates, and may contain the leaf TSA certificate if
	not present in the timestamp

    --trusted-root='':
	Path to a Sigstore TrustedRoot JSON file. Requires --new-bundle-format to be set.

    --use-signed-timestamps=false:
	verify rfc3161 timestamps

Global Flags:
      --output-file string   log output to a file
  -t, --timeout duration     timeout for commands (default 3m0s)
  -d, --verbose              log debug output